Archive 
 |
Introduction
Geopolitics, Turkey and Energy Security
Considering the fact that European gas supplies come primarily from Russia, the idea of having alternative non-Russian gas, namely Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Iranian and Iraqi gas via Turkey is daily becoming more important. In other words, the restructuring of alternative energy transportation routes is not a luxury but an obligation for European consumers as well as for Caspian and Middle Eastern gas and oil suppliers. In addition, Turkey’s large population and its growing economy have made the country a significant regional energy consumer, thus increasing its involvement in these international projects not only as a transport country but also as a large end-consumer.
Oil and Gas Pipeline Network
Energy Security and Pipelines
Crude Oil Pipelines
Currently, Turkey hosts numerous pipelines that extend across the country. These pipelines were pioneered by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline. Nearly 670 miles of the pipeline’s overall 1100 miles pass within Turkish borders. The BTC pipeline is the first transnational pipeline that transports Caspian oil without crossing Russian soil. It carries approximately one million barrels of crude oil per day and accounts for 1.2% of the world’s current daily oil needs. In addition, the BTC pipeline has great importance for connecting the East-West energy corridor. In addition, BTC serves not only as a pipeline, but also connects the related countries in terms of foreign policy and economics. It thus creates an interdependent regional system which is key for regional cooperation and peace.
Another important transnational pipeline in Turkey is the Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline (Kirkuk-Ceyhan). There are also three domestic pipelines constructed for the transportation of crude oil from Turkey’s south-eastern region to domestic points of consumption in the country. These are the Batman-Dörtyol crude oil pipeline, the Ceyhan-Kırıkkale crude oil pipeline and the Selmo-Batman crude oil pipeline. There is also a NATO pipeline and the planned Trans-Anatolian crude oil pipeline running from Samsun to Ceyhan, which is currently in the pre-construction phase. In 2009, the first draft of the project was approved by the partners.
Gas Pipelines
Parallel to these crude oil pipelines, there are also several inter-governmental gas pipelines in operation that pass over Turkish soil. The Blue Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey is one of the most important of these. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) (South Caucasus Pipeline) and the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipelines are among others in operation. The Turkey-Greece interconnector is yet another.
With regards to future project plans, Nabucco is the most well known. It was developed in the early 2000s to break Russia’s monopoly on pipelines and to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. Its IGA (Inter Governmental Agreement) was finally signed on 13th of July 2009 in Ankara. Today, Turkey has invited Russia to become a part of the Nabucco project as an extension of its new cooperation policy. Russia, on the other hand, invited Turkey to be a member of the South Stream project, which was initiated to compete against Nabucco. This indicates a dramatic change in Turkish-Russian relations. Turkey’s multiple pipeline policy, which reflects Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy, has become one of the main pillars of Turkey’s goal of providing for both an East-West as well as a North-South energy corridor.
As a result of these assessments, Turkey’s geostrategic position appears advantageous for the country. However, such a role also implies considerable responsibilities regarding the protection of this critical energy infrastructure that serves not only Turkey but the region and the world. Hosting a major energy corridor means that infrastructure that inhabits it must be secure in order to provide for sustained and reliable energy transport.
Nabucco
Critical Energy Infrastructure and Security Challenges
Regardless of how one defines it, energy security always includes the protection of critical energy infrastructure as a crucial element of the energy sector. It is accepted by experts that terrorist attacks and illegal tapping have important economic implications on oil prices since a security related premium of between $1 - $25 per barrel or higher is factored in by traders (see Ali N. Koknar, ‘‘The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism’’, Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century, California: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 25) . Thus, terrorist sabotage and theft from oil facilities makes economies more vulnerable to the rising price of oil.
Energy terrorism in Turkey
In parallel world the terror organizations have also declared pipelines as legitimate targets in the country. According to media reports since 2004, the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline were attacked several times. On August 5, 2008, a terror organization claimed responsibility for a fire at the BTC pipeline that disrupted the flow of oil through the pipeline for two weeks. The official investigations to identify the exact reason or reasons for the incident are ongoing.
Solutions
In light of the above, it is not difficult to assess that in the 21st century energy and energy security has become much more critical than in previous decades. Unfortunately, contrary to the huge market value and importance of energy companies, current security measures and standards for oil & gas facilities, pipelines and nuclear energy plants are not as sophisticated as they might be. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, terrorists proved that current terrorism methods have reached the phase of “asymmetric terror,” which means the targets themselves will be operative material of terrorist attacks. In doing so, terrorists demonstrated maximum advantage in inflicting large scale damage with a low level of logistical requirements compared to classic terrorist tactics.
The complicated nature of energy security challenges requires collaboration between government- and market-oriented approaches to set up longer energy security agreements at national and international levels. In other words, strategic alliances between government agencies and the energy sector can be one of the mitigation factors against energy terrorism.
International Cooperation ( NATO, UN, EU and OSCE)
Specialized State Protection Forces on Critical Energy Infrastructure
To comply with these responsibilities, a reassessment of the energy security chapter of the Turkish National Security Strategy paper can be re-prioritized to further strengthen the current status of energy security measures so that the issue receives the attention it requires and deserves. Mitigation measures might be further reinforced by the establishment of a new institutional/organizational framework within the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (like the one in the US) or within the Armed Forces, which will specifically deal with energy infrastructure security.
There are several examples of dedicated state security organizations for energy security throughout the world. For example, the Saudi government, in collaboration with the US, began to establish the “Facilities Security Force” to protect national oil facilities. Other countries, for example, Turkey’s partners in the BTC project—Azerbaijan and Georgia—have established dedicated security departments, “Special State Protection Service” (SSPS) in Azerbaijan and a “Strategic Pipeline Protection Department” (SPPD) in Georgia, specifically designated within their national administrations for the protection of energy infrastructure and facilities.
Currently, more than 99% of the BTC pipeline passes through rural areas under Gendarmerie jurisdiction as one of their security responsibilities. Establishment of a similar department within the Turkish Armed Forces that exclusively focuses on critical energy infrastructure in close cooperation with other national security forces will solidify Turkey’s position as a reliable energy corridor and increase the attraction of the country for further energy transportation projects.
Legal Framework
The legal framework on energy infrastructure has been improved through several amendments to existent law. However, several gaps in legislation still remain which may require a call for new legislation or additional amendments to existing law in order to correct legal oversights.
Private Security Contractors (PSC)
The deterrence and prevention of terrorist attacks could also be advanced through professional private security contractors for critical energy infrastructure protection. As an illustration, in 1997, BP’s OCENSA pipeline in Columbia was blown up just once. This pipeline benefited from professional security management. At the same time the Occidental corporation’s Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline in Columbia was blown up 65 times. It did not benefit from private security management. The fact remains that critical energy infrastructure security is not a well known topic among private contractors in Turkey. Indeed there is a need to improve Turkish pipeline protection capacity.
Energy Security Technologies
In addition to hard-security measures, high security integrated electronic systems such as satellite monitoring, intelligent surveillance, intrusion detection, CCTV, perimeter intrusion detection, SCADA, radar systems and rapid response capabilities are becoming more and more sophisticated. Seeing them as more reliable and cost effective solutions, energy producers and transit states are investing in them for the protection of energy infrastructure. These technologies were introduced in Turkey for the first time with the BTC pipeline, which has employed the most advanced engineering technologies available for its construction and protection in the early 2000s.
Community RelationsCommunity level measures not only include awareness building actions but also the provision of a skilled work-force to fill the gap in the energy sector. It will be impossible to guarantee the full protection of the pipeline itself or its facilities by only by focusing on military and hardcore aspects of pipeline protection. Involvement of communities living along the pipeline route is a vital component of pipeline protection. A feeling of ownership over the pipelines and a conviction of the positive impact of pipelines to their communities can encourage people to take an active role in the protection of pipelines and to serve as a supporting resource to the government’s paramilitary protection units. In this regard, social aspects of these energy projects and community-level projects support regional development of areas where pipelines pass, and should also be taken into account at the national and regional levels by related public bodies. While improving community awareness over pipeline security by creating a sense of ownership and by making contributions to the respective communities, it is also important to make sure that a qualified work force is generated in the country to satisfy the needs of the energy sector.
Conclusions
Obviously, energy infrastructure is an attractive sabotage target. Therefore, it is important in mitigating threats to this infrastructure for governments, international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the EU and the OSCE, as well as large international energy corporations to cooperate in the development of new energy infrastructure security strategies. It is fair to say that critical energy infrastructure security deserves much greater attention under the topic of global energy security, especially in the area of security cooperation.
If Turkey wants to take an important role in the energy world, it should continue to focus on emerging trends in the protection of energy infrastructure against terrorism and illegal tapping. Turkey needs an advanced national strategy on critical energy infrastructure security to carry the country from being simply at the crossroads of energy routes to a key player in the energy world. Turkey should be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of its own geographic position, as well as of current and emerging security threats. Equipping itself with innovative and collaborative energy security measures and encouraging cooperation with international actors may support Turkey`s position. If Turkey does so, and it plays its energy security cards wisely by putting some significant solutions into practice, then one can truly expect Turkey to be a regional energy hub, with regional energy companies settling and re-functioning their investment in Turkey’s borders within a considerably short time period. To guarantee the prosperous future of being part of global energy, Turkey should not miss its chance to gain a better understanding of energy security, and should initiate proactive cooperation on energy security with her neighbors, the international community, as well as with leaders and representatives in the private sector.
Within Turkey, all parties related to energy are responsible for coordinating their efforts to increase the visibility of the sector and the critical issue of infrastructure security. In this way, necessary expertise can be developed, and institutionalization of standards can emerge—both of which are key to the development of a sustainable system for energy security. In doing this, Turkey will help itself immensely in advancing its position as an energy hub and in serving as a role model for other parts of the world on energy infrastructure security.
Hasan Alsancak is a practicing international energy security professional. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone.
