China is using its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to advance its energy interests across the whole of Central Asia.  Armed with money, shared borders, and a shared aversion to US influence in the region,  a central part of China's emerging energy strategy is Central Asian capture at least where resources are concerned.  Interestingly, first time JES contributor David Lamoureux writes that through SCO expansion a new Eurasian Energy Community could emerge stretching from the Russian Federation across the Middle East to South Asia.     

Discussion between US President Obama and China's Premier Wen Jiabao on the final day of the Bali Summit over rising tensions in the South China Sea is only the most recent indication of China's emerging maritime power-posture.  Defined as a 'core interest' by the Chinese not only this sea but the other islands and waterways that characterize the region-and the resources that lie beneath them-is a collective source of irritation between China, the US, and China's neighbors.  Dissecting the drivers behind China's military modernization and what it means to China, its economy and global security is the subject of military analyst Henry Philippen's essay. 

Artem V. Goncharuk, the first Russian contributor to the JES, takes an objective crack at analyzing the global implications of nuclear technology transfer to the PRC.  In an effort to gain market share in the world’s largest expanding market for nuclear power, Goncharuk asks the question whether global technology providers, through their lenient terms of sale, are not creating a new nuclear rival in China that has no compunction in re-selling these same technologies, with modifications, to the highest bidder. 

As in many countries, India's national energy security policy has not kept pace with its domestic economic growth and rapidly increasing population.  Both of these trends put tremendous pressure on the nation's resources and drive ever increasing imports from abroad.  While the Indian navy voices a strategic policy that links energy and national security,  the armed forces on the whole are reluctant to get involved in a strategic issue outside of their traditional areas of responsibility.  

The Fukushima disaster is a potential game-changer in how and from what resources Japan will produce energy in the future.  However, based on historic precedent in Japan's power industry this change may be slow in coming.  Institutional barriers, culture, and a close relationship between Japan's regulatory authority and the country's power companies may slow if not prevent the country from transitioning to other fuels over the short term.  In the meantime, the country's bill for imported fuels, oil and LNG, is skyrocketing.  Room for increased energy efficiency is marginal as Japan is the least energy intensive country in the world.  Without nuclear power, the country faces some very difficult decisions in charting its future energy course. 

With Asia's unremitting demand for energy, particularly natural gas, the region is preparing for a gas future.  LNG import terminals are being developed. Malaysia and Indonesia are the world's second and third largest exporters of this commodity respectively but simply cannot supply all of the region's present and future projected demand.  With the North American gas market already significantly altered with the introduction of shale gas, this is one potential future source of LNG to the Asian market.  It remains unclear however how this relationship will develop if at all.

For many, putting the words ‘military’ and ‘energy’ in the same sentence is an anathema.  Yet the US Department of Defense and its Operational Energy Strategy is charting a course to make the armed forces more effective with ‘more fight with less fuel.’ NATO as an alliance should consider a similar path.  Reducing the Alliance’s fuel vulnerabilities by transitioning to alternative fuels not only reduces the strategic vulnerability associated with dependence on oil in military operations and transport but in an age of fiscal austerity it simply makes sense.  At the same time, government itself must do its part and avoid shooting itself in the foot by entering into energy relationships that reduce a nation’s own energy diversity.  Closing the gap between energy and national security may not be easy but it can be done.

For decades, Saudi Arabia played OPEC’s gate-keeper opening and closing its oil tap to keep oil 'reasonably' priced.  There were reasons for this: the threat from Iraq, the need to placate the United States as its biggest customer, and its ability to provide a  reasonable standard of living for a moderately sized population.  Today, Saddam Hussein is history, China has displaced the United States and the population of Saudi Arabia has nearly tripled since 1980.  Contributors Steve Yetiv and Lowell Feld postulate that we are in the midst of a paradigm shift in global oil with a transformation of the Saudis from oil ‘doves’ to ‘hawks.’